as defined at the end of the third campaign, stood the best chance of winning in the end. The Central Powers were in the best strategical positions

Advantages on inside on every flank. As they were

fa enemy . both ^ ^ast West entrenched on Allied soil, they could not be dislodged without a decisive preponderance in men and machinery on the side of their assailants. The overthrow of Roumania had shortened their line, whilst it had lengthened the Russian line by 500 kilometres. If Russia went out of action, the resources of the combatant groups in men would be equal.

As far as the mechanism of war was concerned, the Allies were making strides towards equality. With a sustained effort, 1917 would see the advantage in this respect inuring to their side. On the French Front the Allies were better off than the Germans in ammunition, but not in guns. The French had neglected the advice given by their ablest artillery officers to them as well as to us to concentrate on heavy artillery, especially howitzers of the latest patterns. We accepted this excellent counsel and acted upon it. The French gunner staffs disliked it, and accordingly delayed action. They regarded this advice as a reflection upon their idol, the *soixante-quinze*—an unpatriotic aspersion on this product of French genius. Later on in the year they realised what Verdun ought to have taught

them earlier, that in the matter of heavy guns they were inferior to the Germans, and that this inferiority crippled their offensive power.

The Turkish equipment was not comparable to ours. But so far we had made a wretched use of our superiority in men and material in that area. The Staff seemed to discourage victories in the East,